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Goal Setting in Family Firms: 
Goal Diversity, Social Interactions, and 
Collective Commitment to Family-Centered Goals 
 
ABSTRACT 
Goal setting in family firms is very complex due to the interplay between family and business 
systems. However, this topic is largely overlooked in family business research. In this qualitative 
study of goals and goal formulation processes among 76 organizational members across 19 
family firms, we identify goal diversity as a direct consequence of the overlap between the 
family, ownership and business systems. We found that goal diversity is expressed more strongly 
in the proximity of generational transitions, triggering social interaction processes through which 
organizational members contrast their goals. Our findings suggest that different types of social 
interactions lead to different behaviors, with familial social interactions being more effective 
than professional social interactions in managing goal diversity toward the formation of 
collective commitment to family-centered goals. 
INTRODUCTION 
Goal setting, in all organizations, is a vital function through which individual goals are 
transformed into organizational policies and actions (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1964). For 
family firms, these activities are likely to be more complex owing to the unique systemic 
interactions between the family and the business (Habbershon, William, & MacMillan, 2003). A 
family can use its power and discretion to influence decisions and foster the adoption of family-
centered goals (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Chrisman et al., 2012). Given that family 
firms are very common (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999), and given that family-centered goals play an 
important role in the theory of family firms (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; De Massis et al., 
forthcoming; Habbershon et al., 2003), it is surprising that only limited attention has thus far 
been paid to how organizational goals are determined in these organizations (De Massis et al., 




The family is seen as a dominant group within the family firm (Chua et al., 1999). 
According to Cyert and March (1963), it follows that family-centered goals will become more 
salient as the family coalition increases its representation and authority within the organization. 
However, the relationship between family involvement and the adoption of family-centered goals 
is likely to be complex, and mediated and moderated by several factors (Chrisman, Chua, & 
Sharma, 2005; Chrisman et al., 2012). Goal setting involves individuals, groups and firms, 
nevertheless, the relatively scarce studies available are limited to the firm level, typically relying 
on single informants (e.g., Chrisman et al. 2012; Tagiuri & Davis, 1992) and overlooking the 
individual organizational member’s role in the process. In this study, we attempt to broaden and 
refine the extant theory in the area of organizational goals and goal formulation processes in 
family firms by addressing the following research question: How do the individual goals of 
organizational members influence the organizational goals pursued by family firms?  
Given the ambiguities inherent in multilevel research, qualitative methodologies were 
considered particularly appropriate to accomplish our purpose (Hitt et al., 2007). We undertook 
interviews and gathered non-participant observations and archival documents from 19 family 
firms; thereafter analyzing these qualitative data to disclose the unexplored dynamics of goal 
setting in family firms. The evidence presented in this article refines and extends current 
understanding of how family involvement engenders the adoption of family-centered goals in 
organizations, and offers new insights on intra-family succession as an ideal occasion for 
challenging the status quo and fostering the restabilization of new organizational goals. Finally, 
this study reveals the critical contribution that studying these aspects of goal setting can make to 
theory building in the area of organizational behavior and stakeholder management, as well as 
enhancing practical understanding of organizational goals in family firms. 
4 
 
The article is organized as it follows: in the next section, we set the foundations for our 
study by reviewing insights from prior research on goal setting and from family business 
literature. In the third section, we outline the research design and methods. Thereafter, we 
present the key findings and the inductive process that led us to formulate our theoretical 
propositions. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings and draw conclusions.   
BACKGROUND 
Organizational goals are an important yet controversial concept in organization theory 
(Argote & Greve, 2007; Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1964). In contrast to the economic 
approach of modeling firm decisions made by unitary actors, organizational theorists challenge 
the assumption that organizations have simple, well-defined goals and conceive work 
organizations as political entities in which coalitions are formed among individuals to influence 
the goals that the firm will pursue (Cyert & March, 1963; Stevenson, Pearce, & Porter, 1985). 
According to this perspective, organizational goals may change over time, reflecting the goal 
setting processes among coalitions that presumably pursue conflicting and inconsistent goals 
(Cyert & March, 1963). Thus, defining the goals adopted by an organization requires specifying 
who is able to influence firm decisions, the elements that may affect their individual goals and, 
more importantly, the processes through which the individual preferences are translated into 
organizational policy and action (Stevenson et al., 1985). 
Some researchers assume that the relative importance of different goals in an 
organization is a function of the power of individuals or groups of individuals in decision-
making processes (e.g., Cameron, 1978; Pearce & DeNisi, 1983). The theory of stakeholder 
salience (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), for example, suggests that managers pay sequential 
attention to internal and external stakeholders based on the evaluation of their attributes of 
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power, legitimacy and urgency. However, managers are not necessarily a cohesive group (e.g., 
Pitcher & Smith, 2001), and thus can only loosely be defined as a coalition. Furthermore, several 
organizational members can influence firm behavior through their decisions in different 
organization units (Simon, 1964), while goal setting processes do not necessarily follow 
hierarchical arrangements among coalitions (Jacobides, 2007; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977; 
Stevenson et al., 1985). Consequently, in order to avoid implementation gaps, the formulation of 
organizational goals cannot be limited to the top management team, but should also involve other 
individuals at different levels of the organization (e.g., Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992). 
According to Cyert and March (1963), organizational goals are formed through a process 
that is articulated in three steps: first, coalitions are formed and coalition goals are defined 
through internal bargaining and side payments; second, goals are stabilized and elaborated into 
control-systems that define policy constraints to organizational member actions; finally, 
organizational goals are continuously updated on experience gained (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 
33). Research in social psychology and political science provides further insights in this regard, 
suggesting that individuals purposefully form coalitions to pursue their goals (e.g., Pearce & 
DeNisi, 1983), and that coalitions will tend to be inclusive to increase their bargaining power and 
maximize policy outcomes for its members (e.g., Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973; Rosenthal, 1970). 
Combining the insights from this body of research with the description of goal setting processes 
proposed by Cyert and March (1963), Stevenson et al. (1985) concluded that the problem of 
defining organizational goals is closely linked to that of defining coalitions. They suggest that 
coalitions are continuously formed in organizations in response to variations in organizational 
resources, creating conflicts among organizational members and subsequent bargaining 
mechanisms that lead to determining joint actions. 
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A key assumption in this literature stream is that occupational roles are almost 
completely separate from personal goals (Simon, 1964, p. 14). It follows that the examination of 
goal setting processes is typically abstracted from the individual motives that determine 
participation, and the nature of the processes is largely limited to the business sphere. These 
restrictions become problematic when aiming to extend these insights to the family firm context 
for at least two reasons. First, family members share common bonds and mutual expectations 
that may generate alternative, less tangible forms of side-payments (Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 
2008). Second, relational contracting is juxtaposed to purely economic contracting in family 
firms (Gómez-Mejía, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001), making organizational processes highly 
ambiguous compared to those of non-family firms. Moreover, family business literature informs 
that additional complexity in coalition and organizational goal formation lies in the extent of the 
overlaps between the family, the ownership and the business systems, which presumably can 
also change over time (Habbershon et al., 2003). Prior studies have shown that providing their 
families with financial security and other non-economic benefits is often recognized as an 
important goal of owner-managers in family firms (Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). However, not all 
family firms pursue family-centered goals (Westhead & Howorth, 2007) and the relationship 
between family involvement and the organizational goals adopted by family firms is likely to be 
complex (Chrisman et al., 2012).  
Although family firms are an interesting context in which to examine goal setting 
processes and family-centered goals are important in explaining their particularistic behaviors 
and outcomes (Chrisman et al., 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Chua et al., 1999; Habbershon et 
al., 2003), research exploring the antecedents of family-centered goals is scarce. Extant research 
investigated family firm goals at the firm level, typically relying on a single informant, and thus 
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neglecting the antecedents and processes that characterize goal setting in these firms. As a 
consequence, understanding and predicting the adoption of family-centered goals by family firms 
remains an important challenge for the development of a theory of the family firm. New 
perspectives and innovative research approaches are required to perceive the complexity of goal 
setting implicit in family involvement in the business, and build a more fitting theory on the 
adoption of family-centered goals in family firms. 
METHODS 
Our aim is to build theory in the area of family business organizational goals and to 
broaden existing theory by extending and refining the categories and relationships that have been 
left out of the literature (Locke, 2001). For this purpose, we conducted a theory-building 
qualitative study to better understand the unexplored dynamics of goal setting in family firms.  
Sample and Context 
Data were obtained from interviews, non-participant observations and archival 
documents gathered from small and medium family firms in Italy. We first identified a set of 
firms that could potentially be included in the study through preliminary interviews with 
professionals collaborating with the Center for Young and Family Enterprise (CYFE) of the 
University of Bergamo, which provided a preliminary list and references for 36 family firms 
from their professional networks of small and medium firms. After establishing contact with the 
CEOs and conducting preliminary interviews, we selected a subsample of 24 firms that met the 
following three conditions: (i) ownership majority was held by members belonging to one 
family, (ii) two or more family members were actively involved in the business, and (iii) the 
CEO perceived the firm as a family firm (Westhead, Cowling, & Howorth, 2001). Among these, 
5 CEOs declined participating due to time limitations, while we obtained informed consent from 
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the CEOs of 19 family firms to conduct interviews, to participate as observers in family and 
business meetings and to access their archives.  
The 19 family firms included in the final sample were equally distributed between 
manufacturing (61%) and service (39%) industries, as well as between industrial (56%) and 
business-to-consumer industries (44%). Firm size ranges between 17 and 206 employees with an 
average of 66. Firm age ranges between 13 and 206 years since foundation, the average is 31. 
Seven firms are controlled by the founder generation, eight by the founder’s heirs and four firms 
by descendants up to the sixth generation. Finally, 10 family firms are expecting an intra-family 
succession to occur within the next 5 years, whereas 9 family firms went through a succession in 
the five years prior to the study.  
This sample and context was thought to be sufficiently large and diverse to provide an 
excellent opportunity to examine goal setting in family firms. First, the choice of focusing on 
small and medium firms is a reasonable compromise between the degree and nature of goal 
conflicts most likely to be observed. Although large firms may present greater goal conflict due 
to the larger number and variety of internal and external parties that are able to make claims and 
influence the business agenda, in smaller firms such conflicts are more likely to concern family-
centered goals. Furthermore, the influence of a controlling family is more strongly felt and the 
interactions between family and business are more likely to be observable (Chrisman et al., 
2012). Thus, our choice implied trading external validity against opportunities to gain valuable 
insights on the idiosyncratic outcomes engendered by the interplay between family, ownership 
and business systems. In addition to considerations on firm size, the inclusion of family firms 
that are well distributed in terms of firm age further extends the possibility of providing valuable 
insights into goal formulation processes in family firms. This was deemed necessary to capture 
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the differences in terms of within-group alignment of family members, which is acknowledged 
as differing across family firms at the founding, sibling-partnership and cousin-consortium stages 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). Furthermore, the segmentation according to the family 
generation in control was considered important since this has been shown to affect many 
management processes (Schulze et al., 2003). Finally, the stage of the succession process was 
also considered important since, by definition, a succession is a process that implies significant 
organizational changes, including organizational goals (De Massis, Chua, & Chrisman, 2008; 
Steier & Miller, 2010). 
Once we defined the sample of firms, in order to build and elaborate the theory we 
searched for a purposeful sample of family business organizational members covering a wide 
range of membership and role categories. Specifically, to facilitate the theory building, we 
searched for a context that could serve as an “extreme case” (Eisenhardt, 1989) with dynamics 
that are more visible than in other contexts. In particular, we chose to explore goal differences 
among different groups of organizational members within a general context, namely, the family 
firms as defined above. Consistent with the overlapping circles model, which portrays a static 
degree of interaction (overlap) between the family and the business (Habbershon et al., 2003), 
we chose to include in the study members of family firms within the dominant coalitions of the 
family, ownership and business entity systems. 
We represent the segmentation of the family firm’s organizational members by 
examining Chief Executive Officers (CEO), professional (non-family) top executives (PM), 
young generation family members (YG), family CEO spouses (CS) and old generation family 
members (OG). This set of organizational members maximized the differences along four 
dimensions that were considered particularly relevant to our study. First, we selected individuals 
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that own equity shares of the firm and others that do not, since ownership is likely to affect the 
incentives and priorities of organizational members (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Second, we 
selected family members as well as non-family members because the latter could be expected to 
follow a self-serving attitude, whereas family-members are possibly more oriented towards the 
family firm’s collectivistic goals (e.g., Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Third, we selected family 
members who are actively involved in the business and those who are not, since they may differ 
in terms of their power in the organization and how they perceive the family and business 
priorities (Schulze et al., 2003). Fourth, we selected family members that belong to the current 
CEO’s generation, to the younger generation and to the older generation, since research has 
pointed to relevant differences between incumbents and descendants (De Vries, 1993).  
Given these differences among the types of family firms and organizational members, we 
felt that this combination would provide enough distinct windows through which to view 
organizational member individual goals. Taken together, this sample and context provide an 
excellent opportunity to examine goal setting in family firms. 
Using the purposeful sample of family business organizational members distributed over 
types of role and involvement, we collected data up to “theoretical saturation”. Although 
guidelines to determine non-probabilistic sample sizes are virtually nonexistent (Guest, Bunce, & 
Johnson, 2006), we stopped when no new information or themes were observed in the data, 
which resulted in a sample of 76 informants. The distribution of informants across firms and any 
additional information of the interviewees in the sample are presented in Table 1. 
Demographically, our sample was approximately 18 percent female, with women quite 
uniformly distributed among members involved and not involved in the business (6 out of 14 
were involved in the business), family and non-family members (8 out of 14 were family 
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members), and family generation (4 out of 8 female family members belonged to the family 
generation currently leading the company, 3 to the young generation, and 1 to the old 
generation). Informant age ranged between 25 and 68, the average informant age is 39.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Data 
The primary data collection method involved semi-structured interviews with the 
aforementioned informants. Initially, we obtained preliminary information by asking questions in 
relation to the family firm (firm background, including demographic information such as age, 
size and industry, historical information, information on the family generation leading the 
company and the succession stage, and on family involvement) and the interviewee (parental 
relations with the controlling family, family generation membership, share ownership and role in 
the company). This common set of questions allowed us to observe variations in interviewee 
responses across different organizational members of the family firm. 
To address and specify the objectives of our analysis, and to consistently develop the 
interview questions, we followed a pyramidal algorithm of interview question development 
(Wengraf, 2001). The central research question was therefore articulated into the following 
theory questions: What goals do family firm organizational members pursue? How do such goals 
relate to the individual characteristics of the informants? How do these relationships change 
across family firms? How do the individual goals of family firm organizational members affect 
the decision making processes in family firms? From each of these theory questions, we 
developed those to be included in the interview protocol (for the abbreviated interview protocol 
see the Appendix).  
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Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and two hours, and all were conducted onsite (the 
family firm headquarters or family home) subsequent to the informed consent of the participant. 
The authors recorded the interviews and took notes; all interviews were transcribed verbatim.  
The utility and reliability of interviews as a form of data collection is subject to scholarly 
debate, some emphasize the fruitfulness and underutilization of self-reports and firsthand 
narratives to understand subjective work experiences (e.g., Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000), while 
others stress the weaknesses of such approaches by reason of the tendency of informants to 
adjust their responses to maintain a positive self-image and create favorable impressions (e.g., 
Paulhus, 1984). For this reason, we used interviews as our primary source of data but also 
attempted to offset the limitations of this method by using additional methods where possible.  
In particular, we continually followed informants during family and business meetings 
(e.g., meetings of the board of directors, family meetings, casual meetings), formulating general 
observations of how goals form part of everyday family and business life. Access was relatively 
consistent across cases, with at least three meetings observed in each firm for a total of 114 
meetings. These enabled confirming informant descriptions of their organizational roles, 
assessing the general family business environment and observing the processes through which 
organizational goals are set as closely as possible. In addition, we gathered archival documents 
from various sources in all firms, including contracts, historical books about the organization and 
the family, corporate websites, news articles about the firm and the family, and firm pamphlets. 
Taken together, these secondary sources of data provided a richer context to understand goal 




In order to understand the goal formulation processes in family firms, we independently 
read interviews, observations and archival data, applying open in vivo coding using the 
qualitative data analysis program NVIVO (QSR International, version 9), which also enabled 
exchanging memos to capture themes and broad observations. More specifically, we iteratively 
analyzed the qualitative data by moving back and forth between the data and an emerging 
structure of theoretical arguments that responded to the theory questions presented above, 
according to three key steps (Locke, 2001; Miles & Huberman, 1999).  
The first step consisted in creating provisional categories and first-order codes. For each 
theory question, we began by identifying statements on our informants’ views of the world via 
open coding (Locke, 2001), thereafter drawing on common statements, comparable episodes and 
equivalent content in archival data to form provisional categories and first-order codes. 
Following Miles and Huberman (1999), we used a contact summary form to record the 
provisional categories that emerged in each data source at each point in time. At times, the 
revisited data did not fit well into a category, which led to either abandoning or revising a 
category. We began by reading all transcripts and generating contact summary sheets following 
specific disciplines. Once contact summary sheets were completed, we met numerous times to 
create theoretical categories that could be relevant to answering the theory questions. As 
theoretical categories were created, we went back and recoded the data to see if the codes fitted 
the emerging abstractions. Where this was not the case, we reviewed the “discrepant data” and 
revised the categories accordingly. We continued this process until both reviewers agreed.  
The second step consisted in integrating first-order codes and creating second-order 
themes. Codes were consolidated for each group, namely, we summarized the contact forms 
compiled from all the data collected from CEOs, PMs, YGs, CSs and OGs into different sets of 
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themes, from firms at different generations of family control and at different stages of the 
succession process. This stage of analysis allowed us to make a comparison across roles and 
identify differences within and across different types of family firms as well as changes in our 
variables of interest (e.g., individual goals, goal formulation processes). As we consolidated the 
categories, they became more theoretical and abstract, and we hence moved from open to axial 
coding (Locke, 2001). By way of illustrating, to answer the first theory question we started by 
coding statements that differentiated between right and wrong goals for the family firm, which 
led us to observe that organizational members attribute different connotations to identical goals. 
We used the theme “goal meaning” to capture these elements. 
The third step involved delimiting the theory by aggregating theoretical dimensions. 
Once second-order themes had been generated for each theory question, we sought to aggregate 
the dimensions underlying these themes in an attempt to understand how different themes fitted 
into a coherent picture. We brainstormed alternative conceptual frameworks or models that 
described how these themes relate to each other and to available organizational theories. Once a 
possible framework was identified, we reexamined the data’s fit/misfit with our emergent 
theoretical understanding (Locke, 2001). Figure 1 summarizes the process that we followed, 
showing our first-order codes, second-order themes and aggregate theoretical dimensions for 
each theory question.  
Specifically, the aggregate theoretical dimensions shown were the ones that best 
explained the goals pursued by family firm organizational members and the processes through 
which organizational goals were formulated. 




As we looked at the data from each family firm, three main findings became apparent. 
First, organizational members within a family firm have manifold individual goals that concur 
with the emergence of goal diversity, which is also affected by firm-level factors such that goal 
diversity appears to be more pronounced when an intra-family succession is imminent. Second, 
goal diversity triggers the social interaction processes through which organizational members 
contrast their goals in an attempt to restabilize the conflict. In particular, two different types of 
social interaction processes (i.e., professional and familial) were identified based on significant 
differences in terms of setting, norms and means of bargaining and stabilization. Third, familial 
social interactions appear to be more effective than professional social interactions in managing 
goal diversity in family firms and generating collective commitment to family-centered goals 
among organizational members.  
In describing this process, we begin with a discussion of the goals pursued by 
organizational members in family firms, which helps inform on the individual-level antecedents 
of goal setting in family firms and, ultimately, on how goal diversity and goal conflicts arise 
therein. We continue by presenting the social interaction processes through which goal diversity 
is managed as well as their implications for organizational member commitment to family-
centered goals. We conclude this section by proposing a theoretical model that integrates the 
findings of this study and builds new theory in the area of goal setting in family firms. 
Behavioral Relevance of Goal Categories: The Emergence of Goal Diversity 
 
A taxonomy of organizational member individual goals in four goal categories emerged 
from the iterative comparison of the empirical evidence and previous literature, and this 
contributed to answering our first theory question on the goals pursued by family firm 
organizational members.  
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Insert Table 2 about here 
The taxonomy, summarized in Table 2, is formed along the two dimensions of goal 
content (i.e., economic, non-economic) and goal recipient (i.e., family, non-family). The first 
goal category is family centered economic goals (FC-E), typically emphasized by family 
members committed to keeping company control in the hands of the family and to generate 
various forms of wealth for the family: 
I made the company what it is now, and I want to see our family continue running 
the business through their own efforts (OG) 
I come from a modest family, my first goal was, and still, is to improve our lives. 
(CEO) 
One could say, what we do is to ensure a future for our children. (CS) 
 
A second category of goals were again oriented to benefit the family but were non-
economic in nature. In the family centered non-economic goals (FC-NE) category, we included 
mentions of goals such as preserving harmony within the family, promoting family social status 
and reputation, and maintaining a link between the family and the business identity: 
I feel that maintaining a good atmosphere in the family is one of the most 
important drivers of the behavior of our company. (CEO) 
We want to be recognized as an engine of our territory’s economic development. 
(PM) 
The long lasting values of our family must be a guiding reference for our future 
actions. (CEO) 
The third category of goals was not explicitly oriented to the family and was strictly 
related to the economic aspects of business. These non-family centered economic goals (NFC-
EC) included disparate indicators of economic performance such as growth, survival and profit: 
Increasing the value of our assets as well as the expectations of value-creation in 
the future are considered imperatives. (PM) 
Ultimately, it is important to establish actions aimed at preserving the market 
position that we have achieved up to now. (CEO) 




Finally, non-family centered non-economic goals (NFC-NE) were goals intended to 
satisfy other stakeholders than the family and were not related to economic aspects. These goals 
embraced the improvement and conservation of good relationships with internal and external 
stakeholders, such as employees and the external community: 
I feel a strong responsibility towards our employees and their families. (CEO) 
We should keep in mind that we are part of a community that gives us a lot…We 
want to reciprocate with our activities. (CEO) 
I think that the actions of our company must satisfy ethical requirements, without 
cheating or shortcuts. (YG) 
 
While discussing these goals, the organizational members involved in the study expressed 
several opinions and judgments including comments in relation to their meaning (e.g., positive or 
negative) and their importance. We conveyed these instances into the theoretical dimension 
behavioral relevance of goals. Each organizational member discussed multiple goals belonging 
to different categories and each organizational member was also able to identify a subjective 
hierarchy among these goals, which allowed us to define the goal category that is most relevant 
to each informant. Comparative analyses of the behavioral relevance of goals by informant 
characteristics revealed a number of notable insights on how the relative relevance of the 
different goal categories relates to individual membership within the family, ownership and 
business systems, and to the characteristics of the family firm
1
.  
To briefly present the key insights derived from this body of evidence, we summarize our 
findings on the determinants of organizational member individual goals into three general 
observations. These observations answer our theory questions in terms of individual goals and 
how these goals relate to the characteristics of the informants and firms. They contextualize and 
reinforce existing understanding of family firms as a result of unique systemic conditions 
                                                     
1
 For the sake of brevity, these prefatory analyses have been omitted. The full analyses are available from the 
authors on request. 
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engendered by the interaction of the family unit, the business entity and individual family 
members (Habbershon et al., 2003). This implicitly incorporates the idea that systemic 
interactions in family firms can lead to the coexistence of manifold individual goals contributing 
to the formation of organizational goals. In addition, these observations serve to introduce the 
individual-level antecedents of goal setting in family firms for the purpose of examining how 
individuals influence organizational goals in family firms: 
Observation 1: Organizational member goals in the family firm reflect their 
membership in the family, ownership and business systems.  
 
Observation 2: The individual goals associated with a given configuration of 
organizational membership vary across firms at different generations of family 
control.  
 
Observation 3: The individual goals associated with a given configuration of 
organizational membership vary across firms at different stages of intra-family 
succession.  
 
Overall, these initial observations on organizational member individual goals call into 
question the implicit assumptions in family business research that controlling families share 
common aspirations and values, and that family involvement can thus be considered a 
homogeneous dimension that consistently predicts the extent to which the dominant coalition in 
the firm is likely to pursue family-centered goals (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 
2005). A more nuanced portrait of family member goals emerged from our empirical evidence 
suggesting that family members embrace a much wider spectrum of individual goals than 
previously assumed, which provides some support to the contention that goal alignment among 
family members is not a realistic expectation (Villanueva & Sapienza, 2009). Based on this 
initial body of empirical evidence, we argue that the interactions between the family, ownership 
and business systems generate goal diversity within a family firm, and that such goal diversity 
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increases as the number and membership assortment of organizational members involved in the 
upper echelons of a family firm increases. Consistent with other diversity constructs in 
organizational literature, goal diversity is proposed as a compositional construct (Harrison & 
Klein, 2007) that describes the distribution of goals among the organizational members 
contributing to decision making in a family firm, and can be captured by the width of the range 
of goals actively pursued by members of an organization.  
The fact that the generation of family control and the stage of intra-family succession 
influence the individual goals of organizational members suggests that succession may also be 
related to goal diversity in family firms. The analysis at the firm level presented in Figure 2 
extends this suspicion. After proxying goal diversity by the number of different goals that 
emerged from our interviews in each firm, we plotted this on a timeline reporting the time when 
intra-family succession took place (or was expected to take place, as stated by informants). From 
this additional analysis emerged that the observed goal diversity is greater in family firms that 
are temporally closer to the occurrence of an intra-family succession.  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Thus, the imminence of an intra-family succession appears to momentarily disrupt goal 
diversity, which becomes more perceptible in proximity to generational transitions. Thus, we 
propose: 
Proposition 1: Goal diversity is more strongly expressed when an intra-family 
succession is imminent. 
 
To summarize, the findings presented so far reveal that the factors determining 
organizational member individual goals interact to generate goal diversity. The 
observations linking individual organizational member goals to the concept of goal 
diversity and Proposition 1 offer a novel conceptualization of complexity in family firms. 
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This enables recognizing the variety of goals pursued by organizational members 
belonging to different systems or system interactions. It also allows capturing the degree 
of organization-level animosity related to goal matters within a family firm while 
contextualizing the formulation of organizational goals in organization theory (e.g., Cyert 
& March, 1963; Simon, 1964) to the distinctive case of family firms. In the next section, 
we uncover the implications of goal diversity for goal formation processes in family 
firms. 
Professional and Familial Social Interaction Processes 
To enable understanding goal setting in family firms entailed exploring organizational 
member individual goals and their determinants, which led us to develop the concept of goal 
diversity that encapsulates the complex set of inputs to goal formulation processes in family 
firms. This, however, was only the first step. More importantly, our analysis revealed the means 
by which organizational member goals are processed in everyday organizational and family life, 
which were deemed essential to understanding the distinctive features of goal setting in these 
firms. Family firms are assumed to engage in particularistic behaviors as they place great 
emphasis on family-centered goals (Chrisman et al., 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012), but how do 
family firms manage goal diversity arising from family involvement in ownership and 
management?  
Our data reveal that goal diversity triggers goal-centered social interaction processes 
among organizational members, during which we observed the individuals actively making voice 
(i.e., behaviors that challenge the status quo and attempt to promote change in the organization) 
and explicitly countering family versus non-family centered goals. In particular, we observed 
two major stages that characterize the practical patterns through which organizational members 
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interacted (see Figure 1): the bargaining mode (i.e., what they do), and stabilization of their goals 
(i.e., how they formulate organizational goals). Bargaining was observed when organizational 
members conveyed interpersonal interactions in the form of either settlements or disputes. 
Settlements consisted in negotiations of goals among two or more organizational members with 
symmetrical influences. For instance, a settlement episode was observed during a meeting 
between a CEO and a minority owner who also serves as a PM. The parties were discussing an 
issue related to next year’s budget and, when the PM expressed some concerns relating to the 
dividend policy, the two started negotiating until the percentage of profits to be reinvested in the 
firm was increased. After the meeting, the PM commented: “This is not the first time our views 
have differed, but after all, we respect each other and both believe we can always find a 
compromise as long as we want it” (PM).  
Alternatively, goal divergences were managed through disputes in which typically a more 
influential party (either individual or sub-coalition) imposed goals on a weaker party during a 
verbal fight. For example, a recently appointed CEO described when he first asked his father (the 
former CEO) for a share of the firm’s equity: “Two years ago it became quite clear that I would 
take his position sooner or later, so I started telling him about how the company could grow, 
improve results ...  I wanted to become a shareholder to put things in motion, but he was not in 
favor and left me without much of an explanation … Only now do I understand that he was 
simply waiting to understand my sister’s and my cousins’ expectations about the future of the 
company before making any decision” (CEO). In some episodes, but not always, bargaining was 
followed by a stabilization mechanism observed in the form of formal contracts, agreements and 
other means through which the goals resulting from a bargaining process were formalized and 
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turned into a consistent course of action for the members involved (see Figure 1). Based on this 
evidence, we thus propose: 
Proposition 2: The greater the goal diversity, the higher the occurrence of goal-
centered social interaction processes. 
 
Beyond identifying goal-centered social interactions as processes through which family-
centered goals are bargained and stabilized, the most striking part of our evidence was the 
emergence of two distinct types of social interactions: professional and familial social 
interaction processes. Strong differences between these two types of goal-centered social 
interaction processes were clearly evident in terms of settings, norms and means.  
First, professional social interactions occurred exclusively in the business setting during 
programmed meetings such as board meetings, management meetings, inter-departmental 
meetings and formal bilateral meetings. For example, a professional manager was very specific 
about the arrangement when interacting with a young generation family member he encountered 
in the corridor: “They must respect my time …Even if the issue was urgent, I told him we could 
meet another time, I was busy” (PM). To the contrary, familial social interactions were rarely 
programmed and took place in both business and family contexts, including family councils, 
private meetings in family member offices, home visits, Sunday lunches and dinners. To 
illustrate, a young generation family member said: “Sometimes it is also frustrating, I talk about 
business priorities and objectives at home even more than at the workplace” (YG); a professional 
managers said: “Sometimes I visit him [a YG] at home in the evening ... His door is always open 
to me … The atmosphere is different, I feel relaxed and free to express my concerns” (PM). 
Furthermore, organizational members taking part in professional social interactions had well-
defined roles, as indicated by attire, following hierarchical structures, lack of interruptions and 
questions asked at the end. To illustrate, organizational members often waited for the appropriate 
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occasion to discuss their concerns through professional social interactions: “I didn’t want to 
disturb him, so I waited until the following Friday for our usual weekly assessment” (PM); “I 
waited for the next board meeting to express my concerns” (PM). On the other hand, familial 
social interactions took place in different circumstances (such as in the firm corridor, while 
watching a soccer game or during dinner) among organizational members with undefined and 
often ambiguous roles. Individuals started conversations spontaneously while interruptions and 
distractions were common: “When I have something in mind I just go into his [the CEO’s] office 
and sit down” (YG); “After dinner … I don’t remember how we [the CEO and a PM] started 
discussing my daughter’s career in the firm” (CEO). 
Moreover, professional and familial social interactions contrast administrative with 
affective bargaining, and formal with social stabilization. In professional social interactions, 
bargaining took place through promises of rewards and threats of sanctions. When individual 
goals differed in a professional social interaction, the discussion typically centered on the 
reciprocal benefits and losses of each member, negotiation followed a top-down flow involving 
repeated attempts to convince the individuals at the lower levels of organizational hierarchy, 
often by way of economic benefits. For example, a CEO used economic threats to persuade a 
non-family shareholder to create a financial instrument to support younger family members: “I 
was really unhappy with this closure, after all I am the majority owner, I would have preferred to 
make a joint decision. … I threatened to revise his equity stake” (CEO). As a consequence, 
stabilization in professional social interactions followed the drafting of formal agreements in the 
form of budgets or contracts, but also binding agreements approved with a simple yet formal 
handshake. For example, a CEO described an agreement reached with a professional manager as 
an economic exchange: “I agreed to increased annual marketing investments for the future. But 
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in exchange, I obtained his involvement in training and mentoring two young family members in 
his department” (CEO). In contrast, in familial social interactions bargaining took place through 
value abstraction and expressions of affect. When individual goals differed, more general topics 
entered into the discussion while private communication was often used to convince others (e.g., 
invoking principles, past episodes in the family, and citing other family member experiences). 
Furthermore, individuals tended to calm tension with statements that emphasized their affect or 
their parental empathy: “I pretended to have more autonomy in a project, as it was important for 
me personally, and it was for my family too. … People were talking about my low reliability, but 
my father intervened in my favor by supporting my claims … He said that every one of us must 
have an opportunity” (YG). In addition, stabilization took place in the form of mores (i.e., moral 
codes of conduct among individuals such as those between a father and his children or those 
referring to other family relationships) and folkways (i.e., socially accepted forms of behavior 
such as the observance of rituals or acknowledgment methods). During a dinner at the family 
home, for example, a young generation family manager had an argument with a professional 
manager. At one point, he was stopped by the father (the CEO) who simply told him: “That’s 
enough, go back to your place”. The young manager was immediately silenced. Similarly, in a 
firm where two brothers were serving as CEOs, folkways were commonly used to resolve 
conflicts: “After he [his brother] told me what his priorities are, I just accepted them. … As long 
as we are in charge, I have to trust him; otherwise it will be the end of our firm” (CEO). To 
summarize, the differences that emerged between professional and familial social interactions are 
reported in Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
25 
 
Collectively, this body of evidence reveals that goal diversity among organizational 
members is resolved in family firms with two distinct types of interaction processes, namely, 
professional and familial social interactions. Thus, our analysis provides further insights into the 
idiosyncrasies of goal setting processes in family firms:   
Proposition 3: Professional social interactions involve administrative bargaining, 
whereas familial social interactions involve affective bargaining. 
   
Proposition 4: In professional social interactions, stabilization is achieved 
through formal controls, whereas in familial social interactions stabilization 
follows social control mechanisms. 
 
To sum up, the evidence presented thus far explains how family-centered goals enter the 
agenda of organizational members in family firms, pointing to two distinct social interaction 
processes through which family-centered goals are bargained and stabilized, and goal diversity is 
thus turned into a consistent course of actions to be applied by individual members. In the next 
section we further explore the consequences of these social interaction processes for 
organizational outcomes.  
Collective Commitment to Family-Centered Goals 
The differences between professional and familial social interaction processes have 
relevant implications on organizational outcomes. The actual implementation of family-centered 
goals requires organizational members to act on a common set of strategic priorities (Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1992), and the pursuit of family-centered goals lies at the base of distinctive family 
firm behaviors (Chrisman et al., 2012). Thus, understanding how family-centered goals are 
adopted by family firms, notwithstanding organizational member goal diversity, is the ultimate 
purpose of our study. 
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Our data show that when bargaining was not followed by stabilization, the original goal 
divergences among organizational members continued to subsist. In contrast, after a stabilization 
mechanism was observed, the individuals typically communicated their satisfaction and 
expressed feelings of appreciation and loyalty to family values. For example, after a meeting 
between a CEO and his daughter who is also involved in the firm, she said, “I needed this 
confrontation to see the bigger picture and to share his [the CEO’s] view” (YG). Likewise, a 
CEO was pleased about how a discussion with his brother - a shareholder not involved in the 
firm - was concluded: “When one speaks clearly and sincerely the relationship will benefit both 
parties. …I will reconsider his [the brother’s] position as part of the family” (CEO). In addition 
to organizational members conforming to family values, stabilization also engendered acts of 
resource dedication, where individuals stated their willingness to invest mental and physical 
energy towards family-centered goals: “Once I heard the motivations, I understood their 
importance … I will give my full contribution” (PM); “A promise is a promise. … Now I know 
where to direct my efforts” (PM). 
In sum, the stabilization mechanisms in both professional and familial social interactions 
resulted in stronger commitment to family-centered goals by the members involved, as observed 
in terms of conformation to family values and resource dedication (see Figure 1). As reported in 
Table 4, instances of stabilization and the consequent acts of commitment to family-centered 
goals were observed in both professional and familial social interactions. The range of 
organizational membership categories of individuals involved is relatively similar for both acts 
of conformation to family values and resource dedication. More importantly, only 32 percent of 
professional interactions resulted in an act of commitment to family-centered goals, whereas in 
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familial social interactions, acts of commitment to family-centered goals were observed in 74 
percent of episodes. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Professional and familial social interactions therefore emerge as two parallel yet distinct 
processes characterizing goal setting in family firms with different degrees of effectiveness in 
generating stabilization mechanisms around family-centered goals. In professional interactions, 
family-centered goals are bargained but are rarely stabilized, and goal diversity often remains 
unresolved. On the other hand, in familial social interactions the stabilization rate is much 
higher, suggesting greater effectiveness in bringing together diverse goals and triggering acts of 
commitment to family-centered goals. Thus, we propose:   
Proposition 5: Stabilization of family-centered goals is more likely to occur 
through familial than professional social interactions. 
 
The empirical observations presented above were particularly informative on how family-
centered goals spread and become accepted among organizational members. We obtained data 
describing 165 goal-centered social interactions, at least 7 in each family firm. In each firm, both 
professional and familial social interactions were observed. Each time a stabilization mechanism 
took place, an organizational member expressed greater commitment to family-centered goals, as 
denoted by explicit statements indicating either conformation to family values or resource 
dedication. This evidence formed the premises from which to develop a collective construct 
(Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999) to describe the extent to which the individual actions of the 
organizational members converge towards the accomplishment of family-centered goals. We call 
this construct collective commitment to family-centered goals: 
Definition: The collective commitment to family-centered goals is a common 
mindset and a joint psychological state among family firm organizational 
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members in terms of their feelings of loyalty to the family and the desire to invest 
mental and physical energy in helping to achieve family-centered goals.  
 
Not only did the evidence presented thus far lead us to ground the concept of collective 
commitment in family-centered goals, but it also revealed several important details on how such 
commitment develops throughout the organization. Specifically, it showed that organizational 
members in family firms have the option to confront their goals through either professional or 
familial social interaction processes. In professional interactions, the family-centered goals are 
bargained but are rarely stabilized (see Table 4), and goal diversity is not resolved as individuals 
remain anchored to their own goals and refuse to put their efforts into accomplishing family-
centered goals. As a consequence, we propose: 
Proposition 6: The higher the reliance on professional social interactions, the 
lower the collective commitment to family-centered goals. 
 
To the contrary, familial interactions were often followed by stabilization mechanisms in 
the form of social controls, which guided individuals to adjusting their own goals, to change their 
psychological state and to express commitment to family-centered goals (see Table 4). This led 
us to the interpretation that the formation of family-centered goals in family firms is favored by 
familial social interactions during which family members create norms of behavior that are 
consistent with the family vision, increasing organizational member commitment to family-
centered goals. As a consequence, commitment to family-centered goals becomes more 
homogeneous with recurring familial social interactions among organizational members that are 
repeated over time. Thus, we argue:  
Proposition 7: The higher the reliance on familial social interactions, the greater 




Based on the body of evidence and the propositions developed so far, in the next section 
we synthesize our findings to provide a comprehensive portrait of goal setting in family firms. 
Towards a Process View of Goal Setting in Family Firms 
To help interpret the various concepts and their relationships in our data, we constructed 
Figure 3, which summarizes and generalizes our main findings, graphically presenting the 
observations and propositions that emerged from our empirical analysis.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Mirroring the behavioral assumptions of organizational goal setting (Cyert & March, 
1963), our three initial observations describe the family firm as a collective, intended as an 
interdependent and goal-directed combination of individuals embedded in multiple 
organizational contexts. The overlap of the family system with ownership and management thus 
leads not only to the adoption of family-centered goals (Chrisman et al., 2012), but also entails 
goal diversity, working as a latent force in family firms that may generate resistance to the 
family coalition. Family firms may resolve goal diversity and promote the adoption of family-
centered goals through social interaction processes. However, professional social interactions 
usually leave intact - and may even exacerbate - goal divergences, thus negatively affecting 
organizational member commitment to family-centered goals. To the contrary, family-centered 
goals can be stabilized more effectively through familial social interactions. These promote the 
resolution of goal divergences between organizational members in favor of the family’s interests, 
and lead to the reinforcement of collective commitment to family-centered goals. Finally, the 
model in Figure 3 emphasizes the role of intra-family succession as a catalyst of change (P1). 
When an intra-family succession is imminent, the goals previously stabilized are unfrozen as the 
leadership and structure are likely to be reconsidered (De Massis et al., 2008; Le Breton-Miller, 
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Miller, & Steier, 2004). Thus, organizational members express their goals more fervently and 
activate social interactions that will lead to new stabilizations, and thus a new status quo, similar 
to Lewin’s (1951) classic description of disruptive change as freezing-transition-unfreezing. In 
sum, our analysis clarifies how the adoption of family-centered goals in family firms stems from 
a continuous, composite and cyclical process of goal setting among multiple and diverse 
organizational members. 
DISCUSSION 
The adoption of family-centered goals is a distinctive trait of family firms and a central 
axiom in family business literature (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2005). Prior research theorized and 
empirically tested the link between family involvement and the adoption of family-centered 
goals (Chrisman et al., 2012; Chua et al., 1999). However, there is increasing consensus that 
goals vary among family firms (Chrisman et al., 2005; Westhead & Howorth, 2007). This calls 
for more careful attention in untangling the complexity of management processes resulting from 
systemic interactions between the family, the ownership and the business systems (Habbershon 
et al., 2003; Steier, Chua, & Chrisman, 2009) to understand the processes underlying the 
adoption of family-centered goals and thus improve the predictive power of theories of the 
family firm.  
In response, we conducted a qualitative study that provides new insight into how family-
centered goals enter the operational agenda of family firms. Our findings disclose the multilevel 
dimensions of complexity that characterize family firms, adding factual evidence and new 
notions to our understanding of how multiple and divergent entities generate goal diversity in 
family firms and how such diversity is managed to create collective commitment to family-
centered goals. Specifically, our propositions move the focus of prior research towards an 
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original viewpoint that captures the complexity of goal setting in family firms with the concept 
of goal diversity. This perspective highlights the critical importance for family firms to manage 
goal diversity engendered by the unique systemic interactions between the family, the ownership 
and business systems. In this vein, the framework derived from our findings outlines two distinct 
social interaction processes through which goal diversity can be managed to build collective 
commitment to family-centered goals. While prior research primarily focused on family 
members pushing family-centered goals into the family firm agenda, our propositions suggest 
that for family-centered goals to be taken into consideration and affect the firm’s strategic 
actions, these must be shared and embraced by a broader set of organizational members 
including, for example, professional managers as well as non-family shareholders. Finally, our 
propositions call attention to intra-family succession as a catalyst of change for organizational 
goals in family firms, thus offering an original portrait of goal setting that incorporates the 
multidimensional, dynamic and cyclical aspects of goal setting processes in family firms. 
Our findings have theoretical and empirical implications. While family involvement in 
ownership and management remains a general predictor of the ability of a controlling family to 
influence the policies and decisions of a firm (Chrisman et al., 2012), the active participation of 
family members in the business is also shown to produce greater goal diversity among 
organizational members. This diversity may entail conflict among family and non-family 
managers, family and non-family shareholders, as well as among family members in different 
generations or with different degrees of involvement. Goal diversity is an accurate and fitting 
representation of the varied relations between the family, ownership, and business systems and 
points to the existence of new mediating mechanisms between family involvement and the 
adoption of family-centered goals. On the one hand, we show that familial social interactions act 
32 
 
as a consistent (positive) mediator of the relationship between goal diversity and collective 
commitment to family-centered goals; on the other hand, professional social interactions act as 
an inconsistent (negative) mediator of the same relationship.  
A more careful account of goal diversity in family firms and the internal processes of 
social interactions among organizational members would benefit the development of theories on 
the distinctive behaviors of family firms. Considering the causes and consequences of goal 
diversity within the family firm as a whole, or within specific decisional groups (e.g., the 
dominant coalition, the top management team) would enable a better prediction of the conditions 
under which family involvement in ownership and management lead to the adoption of family-
centered goals in decision making (Chrisman et al., 2012). Furthermore, taking into 
consideration goal diversity and professional and familial social interactions would also benefit 
the accuracy of empirical research. Indeed, while the inclusion of a consistent mediator in a 
statistical model will reduce the main effect, the inclusion of an inconsistent mediator is 
acknowledged as increasing its predictive validity (MacKinnon, 2008).  
Our study also adds to our knowdge of intra-family succession processes and indicates 
the decisive effects of intra-family succession for family-centered goals. Intra-family succession 
is one of the key topics in family business literature (De Massis et al., 2008) as this poses unique 
challenges for family firms. Our study adds to previous work in this sphere by showing that the 
imminence of a generational transition increases the expression of goal diversity in the 
organization and triggers unfreezing processes in relation to the previously stabilized goals and 
restabilization of new organizational goals, thus disentangling the dynamic and iterative nature 
of intra-family succession (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004).  
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In addition, our study has practical implications for families who wish to sustain the 
creation of wealth across generations of family control, finding in our model practical advice on 
the importance of establishing and managing goal setting processes during the intra-family 
succession phases. More broadly, managers and professionals working with family firms could 
make use of our findings to build practical solutions for business families wanting to spread 
family values and build collective commitment to family-centered goals in their firms without 
incurring relational conflicts with other organizational members. A more extensive use of 
familial social interactions could in fact be a viable pathway to building legitimacy for the 
controlling family and obtaining positive outcomes for both the business and the family. To the 
contrary, the exclusive discussion of family-centered goals through professional social 
interactions may be an ineffective - and possibly counterproductive - way to advance the values 
and vision of the family in the firm. Finally, our findings also encourage family firm advisors to 
more carefully implement conflict-resolution strategies in family firms since their effectiveness 
must be adjusted and contextualized to the different types of social interactions as emerging from 
our study.  
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Our study is a first step to uncovering the intervening mechanisms that characterize goal 
setting in family firms, however, as any other qualitative study, it has a number of limitations 
that lay the foundations for future research. One area that deserves particular attention is the 
external validity of our findings, which must be tested and refined with statistical considerations. 
Our experience suggests that collecting data on goal setting processes in the family firm is 
difficult due to time and access constraints; therefore, creative approaches and innovative 
experimental designs are needed. Future research aspirations include capturing and linking the 
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multiple notions proposed in this study with quantitative work in real and practical settings of 
how organizational goals are determined.  
In relation to this, our purpose was to introduce new constructs to explain how 
organizational goals are formed in family firms, but refining and validating these constructs is 
outside of the scope of this article. Refining the original constructs proposed in this article and 
developing reliable scales to measure these constructs is thus proposed as a promising area for 
future research. For example, the construct of goal diversity requires further examination and 
more work is required to advance our understanding of its antecedents and consequences by 
exploring its meaning, its maximum shape and the potential existence of distinct types of goal 
diversity (e.g., see Harrison & Klein, 2007).  
Future research will further advance our understanding of internal dynamics in family 
firms if it factually models the relative influences among individual organizational members. 
Indeed, we recognize that organizational members of family firms may have different degrees of 
organizational discretion to influence the goal setting process. The theory of stakeholder salience 
(Mitchell et al., 1997), for example, could serve as a starting point to address this issue. Finally, 
we intentionally restricted our analysis to small and medium family firms. Although our focus 
allowed us to investigate goal formulation processes in an ideal situation where the influence of 
the controlling family is potentially more important than in other firms, we may have overlooked 
those family firms where greater organizational complexity could potentially lead to even greater 
goal diversity among organizational members. For similar reasons, while we only focused on the 
organizational members in family firms within the ownership, business and family domains, 
future research is encouraged to extend our line of thinking to other actors (e.g., strategic 
partners, institutions) that could presumably influence the goals pursued by these organizations. 
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In addition to extending the external validity and generalizability of our findings, and 
relying on the notions introduced in this study to build new measurable constructs, future 
research could draw from the insights provided in this study to address interesting and 
unexplored questions that are relevant for the development of knowledge on family firms. In 
particular, our observation that family involvement entails superior goal diversity in the 
organization introduces a new perspective to the study of family firms and stimulates further 
research in the area of organizational behavior in family firms. For example, prior research 
emphasized the importance of conflicts engendered by goal incompatibilities (Carsrud, 2006) 
and divergences between individuals with diverse social identities and different goals (De 
Massis, 2012) on the perceived injustice of family and non-family members. This suggests that 
goal diversity in the family firm could have important implications for several organizational 
outcomes such as organizational citizenship, person-organization fit or cognitive uncertainty. To 
our knowledge, studies on organizational behavior in family firms are scarce, however, the 
existence of unique sources of complexity in the family firm organizational environment 
suggests that research in this area could benefit understanding of organizational behavior in 
family firms and refining organizational behavior theories. For instance, how do family and non-
family members choose between professional and familial interactions? How are these two social 
interaction processes engaged in over time? Although outside the scope of our research, these 
could represent promising research questions for future studies to understand how behaviors such 
as voice, whistle-blowing, championing or issue selling occur in family firms.  
CONCLUSION 
Although family firms, as any other business organization, must focus their efforts on 
achieving positive economic performance, the unique and systemic conditions arising in family 
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firms due to the interaction of the family unit, the business entity and individual family members, 
increase the complexity of strategy processes and performance outcomes. Accordingly, we have 
sought to illuminate the overlooked topic of goal setting in family firms. Understanding how 
multiple and competing goals enter the decision processes of family firms is critical for 
management scholars as well as practitioners. We ascertained the complexities and challenges of 
goal setting in family firms and developed a grounded framework that describes goal setting as a 
set of multiple concurrent processes, emphasizing the triggering role of intra-family succession. 
This adds to our knowledge of the link between family involvement and the adoption of family-
centered goals, pointing to promising avenues for future research while offering practical 
insights on goal setting in family firms. We hope to have brought research and practice closer to 
understanding the unique constituencies of family firms and to effectively managing their 




Abbreviated Interview protocol 
 
1. Background information on the family firm. 
2. What are your parental relations with the firm’s controlling family? 
3. Your ownership of firm shares. 
4. Your role in the company. 
5. Please indicate your personal goals in relation to the family firm (define what you are 
consciously trying to do in the family firm) or the goals the family firm should pursue in 
your opinion. Please discuss why these goals are important to you and when and how the 
firm could accomplish such goals. 
6. Are your claims important to other organization members? Why? Please give examples. 
7. Please discuss and give examples of when, why and how you discuss your goals with other 
organizational members. 
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General Information on Data Sources and Informants
a
 

















1 CEO, PM, YG, OG 6 3  Organizational role
b
   
2 CEO, PM, YG 3 2  CEO 21 (27%) 
3 CEO, PM, 2 YG 5 7  CS 5 (7%) 
4 CEO, PM, OG 4 4  PM 20 (26%) 
5 CEO, CS, PM, 2 YG 9 1  YG 25 (33%) 
6 CEO, PM, YG 4 4  OG 5 (7%) 
7 CEO, CS, PM 5 9    
8 CEO, PM, 2 YG, OG 8 6  Involvement in the businesss
b
  
9 CEO, PM, YG 5 1  Actively involved 64 (84%) 
10 CEO, PM, YG 6 5  Not actively involved 12 (16%) 
11 CEO, PM, YG 4 2    
12 CEO, CS, PM, YG 6 7  Family membership
b
  
13 2 CEO, CS, 3 PM, 2 YG, OG 12 5  Family member 56 (74%) 
14 CEO, PM, 2 YG 6 3  Non-family member 20 (26%) 
15 CEO, PM, YG 4 6    
16 2 CEO, CS, 3 YG, OG 8 4  Family member generation
c
  
17 CEO, PM, YG 5 1  Young generation 25 (45%) 
18 CEO, PM, YG 5 7  Current generation 26 (46%) 
19 CEO, PM, 2 YG 9 6  Older generation 5 (9%) 
Notes. CEO, Chief Executive Officer. CS, CEO’s spouse. PM, professional manager. YG, young generation family 
member. OG, old generation family member. 
a
 The names of the sampled family firms, organizational members and other identifying information presented here 
have been omitted to protect the anonymity of our informants. 
b 
Total population of organizational members, N = 76. 
c





Organizational Member Goals in the Family Firm by Goal Content and Goal Recipient 
Goal Content 
Goal Recipient 
Family Non Family 
Economic 




Firm economic performance 
Non-Economic 
Family harmony 
Family social status 
Family identity linkage 






Differences between Professional and Familial Social Interaction Processes 
 Professional Social Interactions Familial Social Interactions 
Setting Business environment only Business and family environment 
Norms Schedules and defined roles  Irregularity and ambiguous roles 
Means of Bargaining Promises of rewards, threats of sanctions Value abstraction, expressions of affect 





Stabilizations and Acts of Commitment to Family-Centered Goals by Organizational 
Membership of Informants 
  
Acts of Conformation  
to Family Values  Resource Dedication  




















66% 50% 48%  78% 53% 58%  74% 
a 
Percentages refer to the percentage of professional interactions concluded by stabilization; 92 total episodes. 
b 









All data were derived from semi-structured interviews; “m” indicates “supplemented with meeting observations”; 
and “d” indicates “supplemented with archival data”.
Second-Order Themes First-Order Codes Aggregate Theoretical 
Dimensions 
Goal Content 
Organizational members discussing the 
nature of their goals for the firm (e.g., 







Organizational members discussing who 
the prime beneficiary of their goals is 
(e.g., the business, the family, the 




Organizational members referring to a 
goal as meaning “successful”, “right” or 
“pleasant”m 
Goal Meaning 
Statements such as “it is important” or “I 
care” referred to a goalm Goal Importance 
Organizational members cited (directly or 
indirectly) in documents that explicitly 
describe constrains to the members’ or to 





Organizational members changing their 
attitude (e.g., mores, folkways) during 









Episodes of intra-member settlements and 
disputes (e.g., organizational members 











Organizational members expressing 
feelings of loyalty to the family or 
willingness to embrace the values and 
vision of the family
m 
Resource Dedication 
Organizational members putting forward 
material or mental resources to help solve 























Familial Social Interactions 
 
Professional Social Interactions 
 
Number of  
organizational members 
Individual-level factors 



















Determinants of Organizational Goal Diversity 
 
Goal Setting Processes 
< 
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P3 
P3 
P4 
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